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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, from a final 
order, entered by the Honorable J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge for the 
Third Judicial District Court In and For the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, wherein the said court denied and dismissed 
husband's post decree Order to Show Cause, In Re: contempt and for 
payment of lien interest in real property, and dismissal of 
husband's petition to modify, and said appeal is authorized 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
in 1992, and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The trial court below failed to duly order that the wife 
should forthwith pay husband his vested lien interest in said 
marital residence, the "trigger events" being inequitable as a 
matter of law. The standard of review is a mixed question of law 
and fact, and reviewed for correctness by the appellate court with 
no deference to the lower court court's determination or the 
conclusion reached by the trial court. Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P2d 
669 (Ut. 1985). 
2. The trial court below improperly denied husband's order 
to show cause In Re: Contempt and for an order compelling the wife 
to forthwith pay husband his vested lien interest, and an order 
dismissing the husband's petition to modify. Thereby denying the 
husband his opportunity to present evidence of a substantial 
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material change of circumstances that may support an order for 
modification of the decree as requested. The standard of review is 
a question of fact. The trial court abused it discretion. See, 
Janse v. Janse, 748 P2d 1249 (Utah, 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated provides in pertinent 
part as follows, that: 
"the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders... the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary"; 
and by analogy, contrast and comparison, 
Section 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Annotated provides in pertinent 
part as follows, that: 
"unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, 
any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that 
former spouse; however if the subsequent marriage is annulled 
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume from the prior marriage only if the party who was 
ordered to pay alimony in the previous proceeding is joined in 
the pending annulment action so that party's rights can 
properly be determined"; emphasis added 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The wife, was granted an default divorce pursuant to her 
complaint on or about the 20th day of April, 1983. The husband, was 
properly before the Third District Court in said proceeding, he 
having duly executed and filed a waiver therein. The Divorce 
Decree provided, among other things, that the wife be awarded the 
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marital residence of the parties' subject to a "shall pay" lien 
interest in favor of the husband in the sum of Twenty Four 
($24,000.00) Dollars. The said lien interest shall be due and 
payable to the husband when either of the following contingencies 
first occurs: 
"when the home is sold"; or 
"six years after the wife remarries". 
The wife married one Denna Landon Scott, the 8th day of 
August, 1986. On or about the 20th day of October, 1987, the said 
marriage to Mr. Scott was annulled by the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 864904250. The husband 
was not made a party to said annulment proceeding. 
On or after the 8th day of August, 1992, the six year 
condition for payment of husband's lien interest, as ordered by the 
divorce decree, had occurred. The husband made timely demand on the 
wife for payment of said lien interest. The husband contended that 
the triggering condition for the payment of his vested lien 
interest in marital property had occurred, to wit: wife had married 
Mr. Scott on the 8th day of August, 1986, and husband made demand 
for payment of said lien interest on or after the 8th day of 
August, 1992. The wife has refused and continues to refuse to pay 
to the husband the vested lien interest. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The husband filed an order to show cause, In Re: Contempt, and 
For an order directing the wife pay the vested lien interest 
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awarded to him pursuant to the divorce decree entered herein. The 
husband also filed a Petition to Modify. 
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT 
Husband's order to show cause came on regularly for hearing on 
Friday, the 30th day of October, 1992. The Third District Court 
Domestic Relations Commissioner recommended the following, that: 
the wife, not be found in contempt of court; the foregoing was 
based on a finding that neither of the court decreed "triggering 
events" that created a duty for the wife to forthwith pay husband's 
vested lien interest had occurred, and that husband's petition to 
modify was dismissed. 
The husband objected to the recommendation of the Third 
District Court Domestic Relations Commissioner, and not 
withstanding said objection, said recommendation became the order 
in the case on the 23rd day of November, 1992, and it is from the 
Third District Court's order denying husband's right to be paid his 
vested lien interest in the marital estate, and the court's 
dismissal of husband's petition to modify, that the within appeal 
is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court below erred or abused it discretion by failing 
to order the wife to pay husband his vested lien interest in the 
marital residence as a matter of law. The "triggering events" 
ordered by the court in the decree are exclusively in the control 
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of the wife and therefore inequitable as a matter of law. 
The trial court below did have jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders in the instant case pursuant to Section 30-3-
5(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended. The Husband herein was 
improperly denied his day in court to introduce evidence to show a 
change of circumstances that may support an order for modification 
of the original decree herein. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and independent therefrom, in 
the event the within court finds that the award of the residence to 
the wife is deemed to be an award other than alimony, i.e. a 
property award, division or distribution, then, in that event, 
absent a controlling provision of law, the terms of the divorce 
decree are controlling. In the instant case the divorce decree sets 
forth the "triggering events" that gives rise to the duty for the 
wife to pay the husband. The "triggering event" of "when the 
residence is sold" is clear and unambiguous. However, the 
"triggering event", the subject of the within appeal, of "wife's 
marriage to another plus the passage of Six (6) years," is subject 
to numerous interpretations. What is "marriage to another" and must 
it be solemnized? The language does not require that the wife be 
married for Six (6) years, what if marriage ends before six years 
has elapsed: by divorce; the new spouse dies, deserts or 
permanently estranges himself from the wife; or what if the 
marriage is annulled? 
There is statutory law in Utah that in the case where a 
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divorced spouse is receiving alimony and subsequently marries 
another, absent an exception in the divorce decree, alimony, by 
operation of law, terminates, and the alimony can only be 
reinstated if the party previously ordered to pay alimony is made 
a party in the annulment proceeding, and the court so orders the 
terminated alimony reinstated. Likewise, and by analogy, the same 
rule as set forth in Section 30-3-5(5) Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended 1952, should apply to property divisions that are 
conditioned on the obligor spouse's marriage to another. To rule 
otherwise is to create an unreasonable classification. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT I 
WHEN INTERPRETING A DECREE, PARTICULARLY IN DIVORCE 
PROCEEDING, THE IMPORTANT OBJECT IS TO CARRY OUT THE 
PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE DECREE 
Counsel for the husband was unable to discover Utah case law 
that specifically addressed the issues raised on appeal. The 
dissenting opinion in Chandler v. West, 610 P2d 1299, 1302 (Utah, 
1980), stated the correct and proper rationale that the court must 
apply when interpreting decrees, and the property settlement 
provisions set forth therein, Justice Maughn, at page 1302 of his 
dissenting opinion, citing Cain v. Cain, 575 P2d 468 (Haw, 1978), 
and Cain, ibid, was more fully expanded by Hana Ranch, Inc. v. 
Kunakahi, 726 P2d 1023 (Haw. App., 1986), holds: 
Interpretations or construction of a judgment, decree or order 
presents a question of law, a trial court's interpretation or 
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construction is not binding on an appellate court and is fully 
reviewable on appeal.... when interpreting a decree, 
particularly in a divorce proceeding, the important object is 
to carry out the purpose and intent of the court that issued 
the decree. 
The purpose and intent of the divorce decree in the instant 
case, and all other divorce proceedings, among other things, is to 
make an equitable division of the parties' marital property at the 
time of the granting of the divorce decree. See, Miller v. Miller, 
683 P2d 319 (Ariz. App., 1984). At the point of entry, said decree 
specifically awarded the husband in the instant case a vested 
interest in the marital residence in the sum of $24,000.00, to be 
paid in the future, and that interest so awarded did constitute an 
immediate, present and vested separate property interest. See, 
Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P2d 1234 (Ariz, 1986). The foregoing cited 
case dealt with retirement benefits, but its holding is applicable 
to the delayed "pay-out" of the vested lien interest in the marital 
residence in the instant case. The court in the Koelsch, Ibid, held 
at page 181, that: 
"It is well settled principle that one spouse cannot, by 
invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the 
community property interest of the other spouse." 
In the instant case the condition(s) for "pay-out", as 
previously set forth are as follows: "when the property is sold"; 
or "when the wife remarries and the elapsing of six (6) years 
following said marriage". It is submitted that both conditions are 
unequivocally in the control of the wife. As a matter of law the 
distribution scheme in the instant case is inequitable. See, Hardin 
7 
v. Hardin, 788 P2d 1252 (Ariz. App., 1990). 
In the Hardin, case ibid, at page 1255, the "triggering 
event", similar to one in the instant case, was "when the property 
is sold", the court held that: 
"the effect of the trial court's award was to give appellant 
an immediate separate property interest wholly within the 
control of the appellee". 
Hardin, ibid, at page 1255, goes on to cite Chrane v. Chrane, 
649 P2d 1384 (NM. 1982), which speaks directly to the remarriage 
issue, when it held that: 
a lien against the former family residence payable upon the 
sale of the house or the ex-spouse's remarriage or death was 
an inequitable distribution of the community estate. The court 
went on to reason: The net effect of leaving the home to the 
wife until she remarries or dies or decides to sell it, is to 
divest the husband of his equity in the property. In fact, he 
may never live to receive any portion of that equity. 
The court in Hardin, Ibid, at page 1255, went on to further 
hold that substantial time delays are also per se inequitable, even 
if the possessing spouse pays interest, the interest issue was not 
a provision that was part of the decree in the instant case, see In 
Re: Marriage of Salter, 609 P2d 374 (Ore. App., 1980). 
It is undisputed that the purpose and intent of the court in 
the instant divorce proceedings, was among other things, to make an 
"equitable division" of the marital estate of the parties herein. 
The parties, were at the time of the entry of the divorce decree 
without minor children, without any other type of continuing 
entanglement that would justify the inordinate delay in the "pay-
out" of husband's vested lien interest herein, and yet, more than 
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ten (10) years have elapsed since the date of the entry of the 
divorce decree herein. The husband's vested lien interest, as 
recognized by the court at the time of entry of the divorce decree 
and subsequent hearings herein, was and is the sum of $24,000.00. 
From the time of entry of the decree and subsequent hearings 
thereon, there remains no time certain outside the exclusive 
control of the possessing party, the wife, as to when said vested 
lien interest must be paid. Such unilateral control over the 
"triggering event" is inequitable at law, and clearly fails to meet 
the purpose and intent of the court in such proceedings. 
The court below erred or abused it discretion by failing to 
order that the wife forthwith pay the vested lien interest to the 
husband, and by dismissing the husband's Petition to Modify, and 
said orders should be reversed. Also under Section 30-3-5(3) Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, when the wife's remarriage to Mr. 
Scott was annulled, the court could have considered ordering Mr. 
Scott to pay husband his vested lien interest if wife had so 
requested. 
ARGUMENT II 
AS A GENERAL RULE, ORDERED ALIMONY TERMINATES 
UPON THE REMARRIAGE BY THE RECEIVING SPOUSE, EVEN 
IF THE SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE IS ANNULLED 
The legislature in the State of Utah has enacted statutes that 
mandate procedures for handling certain post decree alimony issues 
that are not within the scope of the provisions of the divorce 
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decree itself. See, Section 30-3-5(5) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides in pertinent part as follows, that: 
"unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, 
any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that 
former spouse; however if the subsequent marriage is annulled 
and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume from the prior marriage only if the party who was 
ordered to pay alimony in the previous proceeding is joined in 
the pending annulment action so that party's rights can 
properly be determined"; emphasis added 
Likewise, case law has held as follows, that: 
. . . alimony terminated upon remarriage; and that it was not 
automatically re-instated by the annulment, see Russell v. 
Russell, 587 P2d 133 (Utah, 1978, citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 
564 P2d 1380 (Utah 1977). 
In the instant case the provisions of the decree provided the 
terms as to when the vested lien interest was to be paid to the 
husband. The wife married another, one Denna Landon Scott, on or 
about the 8th day of August, 1986. The wife's subsequent marriage 
was annulled, on or about the 20th day of October, 1987, however 
notwithstanding the annulment, and as proscribed by the terms of 
the divorce decree previously entered herein, Six (6) years had 
elapsed since the marriage of the wife to Mr. Scott and husband's 
demand for payment of his vested lien interest from his former 
wife. If the husband's vested lien interest is deemed by the within 
court to be alimony, or in the alternative, if not deemed to be 
alimony, it should be treated the same or similarly thereto by 
analogy, and the foregoing statute, i*e. Section 30-3-5(5) Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended would then be dispositive of the 
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disputed issues herein. 
In the proceedings below, the trial court erred or abused its 
discretion when it dismissed husband's Order to Show Cause In Re: 
Contempt and Why Wife should not be ordered to forthwith pay 
Husband's Vested Lien Interest. The said order of dismissal should 
be reversed and the wife should be found in contempt of court, and 
punished accordingly, and it should be further ordered that the 
wife forthwith pay the husband his claimed vested lien interest in 
the sum of $24,000.00, together with reasonable interest thereon. 
See, Eames v. Eames, 735 P2d 395 (Utah App., 1987), the court in 
said case held, at page 399, as follows, that: 
When a residence is a major marital asset, it has become quite 
common to order it sold and the net proceeds divided. It is to 
be expected that the equity share of the spouse who does not 
have the pre-sale use and benefit of the residence will accrue 
interest at some reasonable rate, even though the interest 
might not be payable until the sale proceeds are available. 
ARGUMENT III 
MARITAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 
OF DIVORCE DECREES ARE SUBJECT TO THE 
CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The trial court below does have continuing jurisdiction to 
change, make a new or modify existing orders previously entered as 
provisions of a divorce decree. Said orders of modification can be 
entered to modify provisions relating to distributions of marital 
property, see Section 30-3-5(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, which provides in pertinent part as follows, that: 
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"the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders... the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary"; 
The case law, when interpreting said section, held in Chandler 
v. West, 610 P2d 1299, 1300 (Utah, 1980), and subsequently 
reaffirmed in Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), that: 
"property settlements are entitled to greater sanctity than 
alimony and support payments in proceedings to modify divorce 
decrees." the court went on to emphasize that "property 
settlements are not sacrosanct and are not beyond the power of 
a court of equity to modify." 
Notwithstanding the alleged clarity of the "triggering events" 
language, the husband is entitled to his day in court on the issue 
of whether there has been a substantial change of material 
circumstances subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree not 
contemplated at the time of the entry of the decree that would 
allow the court below to modify the provision or provisions as 
requested. See Muir v. Muir, 200 Utah Adv. Retp. 41 (1992) (Citing 
Jense v. Jense, 748 P2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989), Cert 
dismissed, 795 P2d 1139 (Utah, 1990); Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P2d 
393, 394 (Utah, 1985) (per curiam). 
The trial court below erred or abused its discretion when it 
dismissed husband's Petition to Modify in the proceedings below, 
and said order of dismissal should be reversed and the husband's 
Petition to Modify reinstated forthwith. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court below should be reversed. The wife should be ordered 
to forthwith pay to the husband his vested lien interest in the 
marital residence in the sum of $24,000.00, plus interest thereon. 
As a matter of law, the provisions of the decree that proscribed 
the "triggering events" were and are inequitable. The "triggering 
events" were each in the exclusive control of the wife. 
The court below should be reversed. The husband's petition to 
modify was improperly dismissed, and it should be reinstated 
forthwith. The trial court below did have continuing jurisdiction 
to hear husband's petition to modify. The husband is entitled to 
present his evidence to prove a material substantial change of 
circumstances that may justify a modification of the decree herein. 
The court below should be reversed. By analogy, the annulled 
remarriage of the wife and the payment of the vested lien interest 
of the husband, should be subject to the same statutory provisions, 
i.e. Section 30-3-5(5) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, as 
termination of alimony by remarriage. It is submitted that for the 
purposes of the property settlement the "act of marriage" is 
sufficient to terminate, or as in the instant case, "trigger" 
payment, unless the party claiming the relief as a result of the 
marriage is made a "party in interest" in the annulment proceeding. 
The within case can be decided on the following four factors: 
1. The lawful marriage of the Mr. and Mrs. Watts to one 
another. 
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2. The lawful default divorce of the Watts from one another. 
3. The Utah Statute Section 30-3-5(5) enacted to give 
validity and to protect the first divorced spouse (Mr. Watts) in 
the event of remarriage of the former wife (Mrs. Watts) to another, 
and thereafter the wife cohabited as husband and wife with the new 
husband, and after so residing for more than one year obtained an 
annulment. 
4. The Utah Statute Section 30-1-4.5 enacted to give 
validity to an non solemnized marriage relationship created not 
withstanding the lawful technicality the solemnized remarriage was 
defective through no fault of the first husband, Mr. Watts. 
DATED this / 7 ^ day of May, 1993. 
["FULLY SUBMITTED 
foRGE<^9. /^ EARLfiy/ 
Attorney for tlher 
Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 1993, that 
Two (2) true and correct copies of APPELLANTS BRIEF, were duly hand 
delivered to counsel for the Appellee at the following address: 
THOMAS R. KING 
Attorney at Law 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
ADDENDUM 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children-
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
:
 stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 
consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
\, (6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child cus-
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
; and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
{ the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
•; vailing party in that action, if the court determines 
j , that the petition was without merit and not asserted 
| in good faith. iwi 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according 
to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solem-
nized marriage under the provisions of this chap-
ter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, 
and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have ac-
quired a uniform and general reputation as hus-
band and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a mar-
riage under this section must occur during the rela-
tionship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of that relationship. 
Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this sec-
tion may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as 
facts in other cases. 1987 
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that occurred prior to and were indepen-
dent of the taint of the unlawful invasions, 
waa permissMe, We beJieve the SBme is 
true in this case. 
Although the state could argue that tes-
timony of the officers about the delivery of 
the marijuana would be permissible be-
cause no Fourth Amendment violation was 
involved to that point, events from the time 
of the entry of the officers into the home, 
as well as the fruits of their search of it, 
were properly suppressed. Failure to sup-
press would, as appellee points out, com-
pletely emasculate the warrant require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment because 
probable cause is usually based on indepen-
dent information obtained by the officers. 
To allow them entry into a home without a 
warrant would eliminate any protection af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment. 
The suppression order of the trial court 
was proper. 
LIVERMORE, P.J.,- and LACAGNINA, 
J., concur. 
(O f KlYNUM8fRSYSltM> 
163 Ariz. 501 
In re the Marriage of Richard Allen 
HARDIN, Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
Patricia HARDIN, Respondent-Appellee. 
No. 1 CA-CV 88-586. 
Court of Appeals of Arizona, 
Division 1, Department B. 
March 1, 1990. 
Husband appealed from judgment of 
the Superior Court, Yuma County, Cau^e 
No. 54999, H. Stewart Bradshaw, J., en-
tered in dissolution proceeding. The Court 
of Appeals, Voss, P.J., held that: (1) trial 
court's determination that wife was "in 
need of assistance," together with its con-
sideration of parties' relative financial posi-
tions and wife's station in life as the result 
of marriage, was sufficient to support 
award of spousa) maintenance, but (2) judg-
ment dividing community property which 
gave husband lien on family home, payable 
upon sale of property, improperly deprived 
husband of his vested property interest in 
community. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce <S=>286(3) 
Review of order awarding spousal 
maintenance is limited to determining 
whether trial court abused its discretion. 
A.R.S. § 25-319. 
2. Appeal and Error «=>907(2) 
Without transcript of trial, Court of 
Appeals was required to assume that evi-
dence presented to trial court was suffi-
cient to support it findings. 16 A.R.S. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 11(b). 
3. Divorce <3=>237 
Husband's failure to contribute to fam-
ily finances prior to dissolution was inap-
propriate basis upon which to award spous-
al maintenance. A.R.S. § 25-319. 
4. Divorce <3=»237 
Trial court's determination that wife 
was "in need of assistance," together witih 
its consideration of parties' relative finan-
cial positions and wife's station in life as 
the result of marriage, was sufficient to 
support award of spousal maintenance. 
A.R.S. § 25-319. 
5. Divorce <3=*252.3(2) 
Trial court's division of community 
property need not be exact, but it must 
result in substantial equity. 
6. Divorce <&=»252.3<2) 
Upon dissolution, community property 
is divided such that each party receives 
immediate, present, and vested separate in-
terest. 
7. Divorce &=>252.5(3> 
Judgment dividing community proper-
ty which gave husband lien on family 
home, payable upon sale of property, im-
properly deprived husband of his vested 
HARDIN v. 
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interest in community, where date of sale 
was not specified in order. A.R.S. 
§ 25-318. 
Bruce Yancey, Yuma, for petitioner-ap-
pellant. 
Community Legal Services by Michael 
Figgins, Yuma, for respondent-appellee. 
VOSS, Presiding Judge. 
Appellant raises two issues for our re-
view. First, whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding spousal mainte-
nance to appellee; and second, whether the 
trial court failed to make an equitable divi-
sion of the community estate in awarding 
appellant a judgment enforceable by a 
"non-specific" lien on the family residence 
awarded the appellee. We affirm the trial 
court's award of spousal maintenance, but 
reverse and remand with respect to the 
division of the community estate. 
Background 
Appellant and appellee were married 
February 17, 1985. During the course of 
the marriage, the parties purchased a fami-
ly residence in Yuma, Arizona. On Octo-
ber 20, 1987, appellant filed a petition for 
dissolution in Yuma County. The matter 
was tried to the court and an order setting 
forth the court's ruling was filed Septem-
ber 14, 1988. Appellant's motion to recon-
sider was denied. A decree of dissolution 
was filed December 9, 1988. Appellant ap-
peals from both the denial of his motion for 
reconsideration and the underlying judg-
ment. 
Spousal Maintenance 
The trial court awarded appellee $200 per 
month for thirty months for spousal main-
tenance. Appellant argues that the trial 
court abused its discretion in basing the 
award of spousal maintenance on appel-
I. A.R.S. § 25-319 states in pertinent part: 
A. In a proceeding for dissolution of mar-
riage or legal separation . . . the court may 
grant a maintenance order for either spouse 
for any of the following reasons if it finds that 
the spouse seeking maintenance: 
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lant's failure to adequately, help with fami-
ly expenses prior to the dissolution. Appel-
lant asserts that he paid a substantial por-
tion of the family expenses and that there-
fore trial court's factual conclusion is incor-
rect. 
[1] The trial court's grant of spousal 
maintenance is governed under A.R.S. 
§ 25-319.1 An award of spousal mainte-
nance is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Battiste v. Battiste, 135 Ariz. 
470, 662 P.2d 145 (App.1983); In re Mar-
riage ofHinkston, 133 Ariz. 592, 653 P.2d 
49 (App.1982). Our review is limited to 
determining whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding spousal mainte-
nance. In re Marriage of Bergert 140 
Ariz. 156, 680 P.2d 1217 (App.1983). 
The trial court made the following find-
ings in an order dated September 14, 1988: 
6. The Respondent has requested that 
she receive spousal maintenance. The 
record shows that the Petitioner contrib-
uted no funds to pay community debts 
for a period of several months, except to 
pay some $345.00 on the home property. 
7. The Respondent is in need of as-
sistance. The Petitioner is capable of 
earning for [sic] in excess of what he is 
presently earning. The Respondent's 
need and station in life in which Petition-
er placed her should require that the 
Petitioner pay to the Respondent the 
sum of $200.00 per month as and for 
spousal maintenance for a period of thir-
ty months beginning October 1, 1988. 
[2] Appellant failed to provide this 
court with a transcript of the trial court 
proceedings. See Arizona Rules of Civil 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(b). The 
record in this appeal consists of the parties' 
briefs and a copy of the clerk's file. With-
out a transcript of the trial, we must as-
sume that the evidence presented to the 
trial court was sufficient to support its 
1. Lacks sufficient property, including 
property apportioned to such spouse, to pro-
vide for his or her reasonable needs. 
2. Is unable to support himself or herself 
through appropriate employment . . . or lacks 
earning ability in the labor market adequate 
to support himself or herself. 
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findings. Renner v. Kehl, 150 Ariz. 94, 
722 P.2d 262 (1986). 
[3] In awarding spousal maintenance it 
appears that the trial court found that ap-
pellant failed to contribute to the family 
finances for some period prior to dissolu-
tion. While this might be a proper consid-
eration in dividing the community property, 
we believe it is an inappropriate basis upon 
which to award spousal maintenance. See 
Buttram v. Buttram, 122 Ariz. 581, 596 
P.2d 719 (App.1979) (spousal maintenance 
does not encompass settlement of property 
issues). Were this finding relied on exclu-
sively for the award, we would be inclined 
to reverse. However, in addition to this 
finding, the trial court stated other find-
ings which we believe focus on issues prop-
erly concerning maintenance. 
[4] The trial court noted that the appel-
lee was "in need of assistance." While this 
language is broad, we believe it is suffi-
cient under either A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(l) or 
(2) as indicating an insufficient property 
base or inadequate labor skills with which 
appellee could support herself. The trial 
court also noted the parties' relative finan-
cial positions and appellee's present station 
in life as a result of this marriage. All of 
this is appropriate initially for determining 
the need for spousal maintenance. We 
again note that the trial court is given wide 
latitude in awarding spousal maintenance 
and we will not interfere unless a clear 
abuse is shown. In re Marriage of Hink-
ston, 133 Ariz, at 593, 653 P.2d at 50. We 
are unable to say, with the record before 
us, that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion. 
Division of Community Property 
In dividing the community property, the 
court awarded appellee the family home 
and appellant a lien thereon. The lien was 
set in an amount equal to one-half the net 
sale price of the family home or the sum of 
$17,500 whichever is less. The trial court's 
order did not provide a date upon which the 
2. A.R.S. § 25-318(A) states that the trial court 
"shall . . . divide the community, joint tenancy, 
and other property held in common equitably, 
though not necessarily in kind. .." A.R.S. 
lien was to be paid, nor did it provide for 
interest. 
Appellant argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion in dividing the com-
munity estate by awarding appellant the 
"non-specific" lien. Appellant contends 
that a lien which does not contain any 
provision as to when it may be realized 
fails as an equitable division of property 
under A.R.S. § 25-318.2 We agree. 
[5, 6J The trial court's division of com-
munity property need not be exact, but it 
must result in substantial equality. Miller 
v. Miller, 140 Ariz. 520, 683 P.2d 319 (App. 
1984). "In exercising its discretion the 
court has to award a substantial equivalent 
to each spouse because an uneven distribu-
tion unconstitutionally deprives the spouse 
of a vested interest." 3 CM. Smith & I. 
Cantor, Arizona Marriage Dissolution 
Practice § 323, at 360 (1988). Upon disso-
lution, community property is divided such 
that each party receives an immediate, 
present, and vested separate property in-
terest. Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 
713 P.2d 1234 (1986). 
Our supreme court stated: 
It is a ''settled principle that one spouse 
cannot, by invoking a condition wholly 
within his control, defeat the community 
interest of the other spouse." In re 
Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal.3d 779, 
786, 582 P.2d 96, 100, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 13 
(1978). This principle has even stronger 
applicability when the property wholly 
within the control of another is the sepa-
rate property of an ex-spouse. See In re 
Marriage of Gillmore, 29 Cal.3d 418, 
423, 629 P.2d 1, 4, 174 Cal.Rptr. 493, 496 
(1981). 
Id. at 181, 713 P.2d at 1239. While 
Koelsch involved retirement benefits, we 
believe the logic of the quoted section is 
sound and applies herein. 
[7] The trial court intended to give the 
appellant a separate property interest 
equal to one-half the value of the family 
§ 25-318(C) allows the court to "impress a lien 
upon the . property awarded to either party 
in order to secure the payment of any . . . equity 
the other party has in or to such property " 
STATE v. F 
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residence. To secure this interest the trial 
court awarded appellant a lien apparently 
payable upon sale of the property, the date 
of which was unspecified. The effect of 
the trial court's award was to give appel-
lant an immediate separate property inter-
est wholly within the control of appellee. 
Such an arrangement is not contemplated 
by A.R.S. § 25-318 and is denounced by 
Koelsch. 
We note that other jurisdictions have de-
clined to allow similar, even less egregious 
liens on judgments. In Marriage of Sal-
ter, 45 Or.App. 555, 609 P.2d 374 (1980), 
the Oregon Appellate Court held that an 
interest bearing judgment enforceable by a 
lien payable fifteen years after its inception 
was an inequitable distribution of commu-
nity assets. That court modified the trial 
court's award to include monthly payments 
within a reasonable period after the disso-
lution and shortening the time in which the 
entire judgment was to be satisfied. 
In Chrane v. Chrane, 98 N.M. 471, 649 
P.2d 1384 (1982), the New Mexico Supreme 
Court held that a lien against the former 
family residence payable upon the sale of 
the house or the ex-spouse's remarriage or 
death was an inequitable distribution of the 
community estate. The court reasoned: 
The net effect of leaving the home to the 
wife until she remarries or dies or de-
cides to sell it, is to divest the husband of 
his equity in the property. In fact, he 
may never live to receive any portion of 
that equity. 
Id. at 472, 649 P.2d at 1385. 
We hold that the trial court's failure to 
give form and substance to appellant's lien 
results in an unequal property distribution 
which is arbitrary, unreasonable, and a 
deprivation of appellant's vested property 
interest in the community. We therefore 
remand for proceedings consistent with oui 
holding. 
JACOBSON and KLEINSCHMIDT, JJM 
concur. 
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